I got first blood for a challenge called “safelist” in SekaiCTF 2022, it’s a challenge about xsleaks and request timing in particular, here is my writeup.
Challenge description:
Safelist™ is a completely safe list site to hold all your important notes! I mean, look at all the security features we have, we must be safe!
In Part 1, we learned the basic principle of stealing data with CSS and successfully stole the CSRF token as a practical example using HackMD. This article will delve into some details of CSS injection and address the following issues:
When it comes to attacks on web front-ends, most people think of XSS. But what if you can’t execute JavaScript on the web page? Are there other attack methods? For example, what can you do if you can insert a style tag?
In 2018, I wrote an article about CSS keylogger: attack and defense after seeing related discussions on Hacker News. I spent some time researching it.
Now, four years later, I have re-examined this attack technique from a security perspective and plan to write one or two articles to explain CSS injection in detail.
This article covers:
When it comes to CSP bypass, a kind of technique using AngularJS is well-known. One of it’s variant requires another library called Prototype.js to make it works.
After understanding how it works, I began to wonder if there are other libraries on cdnjs that can do similar things, so I started researching.
This article will start with the CSP bypass of cdnjs, talk about why prototype.js is needed, and then mention how I found its replacement on cdnjs.
In Auguest, I and bruno made a XSS challenge on Intigriti. When we decided to make it, we hope it’s a difficult and fun challenge, and the players can also learn a lot from it.
Here is the writeup for this challenge.
At first, I had no intention of writing a post about this challenge because the author already had a greate one: corCTF 2022 Challenge Writeups. But, it’s my first time being the only solver for a challenge, it’s still worth writing one.
In this post, I will talk about how I tackled the challenge in the first place and how I solved it in the end.
I didn’t participate in this CTF, but I found two interesting problems related to content type and I want to write down the solutions.
We all heard about insecure deserialization vulnerability and saw many real-world cases in Java, PHP, and other languages.
But, we rarely hear about this vulnerability in JavaScript. I think it’s because the built-in serialization/deserialization function JSON.parse and JSON.stringify are only for basic data structures like string, number, array and object.
Class and function are not supported, so there is no way to run malicious code during deserialization.
What if we implement our deserialization logic and support class and function? What could possibly go wrong?
GoogleCTF 2022 has a web challenge called “HORKOS,” which shows us the way.
This is my first time participating in GoogleCTF. I solved a web problem (HORKOS) and almost solved another one (POSTVIEWER). Here are the solutions for each web problem, sorted by the number of solves.
The keywords are as follows:
This holiday, there was justCTF and WeCTF, which was all web. I originally wanted to participate in both, so if I got stuck on one, I could switch to the other. However, I got stuck on both XD
This time, justCTF had many good web challenges. As usual, I will write some notes and record some keywords:
:target selectorThe order below is sorted by the number of solves, with more solves at the top.